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FOREWORD
The formation of The Asian American Assembly for Policy
Research has been a welcome event to me for a number of reasons.
First, because a knowledge of Asia among Americans continues to
be inadequate, despite the long history of U.S. relations and
initiatives with that continent. American perceptions of Asia have
tended to be distorted by the cycles of history, fired-up at one
moment by involvement in Asian wars, and then receding at
another into the mists of isolationist reaction. Meanwhile, an
expert elite of non-Asian Americans tends to impose views that
can be precious, recondite and self-serving. The growing presence
in the academic establishment of scholars of Asian origin is a
resource which can elevate the validity of research and opinion in
this process. And the Assembly can contribute to giving that
resource a voice.
Second, as the number of Asian immigrants to the U.S.
accelerates, it has been becoming more and more important that
they be assimilated into the fabric of American society. Before
they form major interest groups which seek special advantage to
overcome perceived discriminations, and thus add to a proliferating fragmentation of the American nation, they must be helped to
understand their American surroundings, and thus to achieve
Americanhood. The intellectual leadership among them has a role
to play in this process, and the Assembly can help to focus on that
role.
Third, there has not been any commonality among AsianAmericans to begin with. Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos,
Indians and the others see themselves as much distinct from each
other as they do from other Americans. So the Assembly has a
role in bringing them together, and in providing them with an
opportunity to address common problems and to share common
goals.
I was pleased to accep_t Professor Winberg Chai's invitation to
be chairman of the Ass~mbly's advisory council because a nonAsian American component of such an undertaking is obviously
indicated and because of my own identification with the values I
have mentioned. The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., of which I am
president, fosters American knowledge of Asia through its
Scholars Program, which gives young Americans of high
potential a year's experience in Asia, and through its Asian
Studies Program, which supports scholarly work in AsianAmerican interactions at major university graduate centers. In
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the field of recent Asian immigrants, China Institute in America,
of which I am chairman, conducts bilingual vocational training
programs.
The papers in the present volume (abstracts) are those which
were submitted to the Assembly's conference in New York in
April, 1977. They bring to bear new insights to that major
question of U.S. foreign policy- relations with China. While their
authors share a commonality of their Chinese ethnicity, they are
also broadly representative of the various approaches to the issues
involved. Together, they form a body of thought which helpfully
contributes to this complex subject.
I look forward to the publication of additional reports on other
subjects from the Assembly's conferences.

Henry Luce III

Preface
The foundation of the Asian American Assembly was begun
in 1972 when the City College of New York received an initial
grant of $25,000 from the Field Foundation of New York to help
the Department of Asian Studies in developing a "viable City
College-run community service program for Chinatown." One
year later, President Robert E. Marshak provided an additional
$6,000 from the City College Fund to expand the college-run
community service program. In 1976, the City College received a
second $25,000 grant from the Field Foundation to continue
community related projects, including the establishment of the
Asian American Assembly for Policy Research. In Spring, 1977,
additional contributions were made to the Asian American
Assembly from the City College Fund.
The goals of the Asian American Assembly are threefold:
First, the identification and recommendation for solutions to the
major problems confronting Asian Americans. Second, research
and publications by national panels appointed by the Assembly to
generate a permanent body of information that may be useful as
resource materials. Finally, the Assembly should provide a forum
of scholars, community leaders and business executives on a
regular basis - persons who can bring together both theoretical
discipline and practical experience in the Asian American
community.
During 1976, the City College's Asian American Assembly in
cooperation with the Department of Asian Studies has sponsored
five seminars, two major workshops and one regional conference.
Approximately one hundred specialists in education, social work
and community leaders have participated in these workshops and
conferences. Community organizations represented including the
following:
Chinatown Health and Service Center
Chinatown Improvement Council
Chinatown Manpower Project
Chinatown Planning Council
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association
Immigrant Social Services
Project Ahead
Two Bridges Neighborhood Council, etc.
During 1977, the Asian American Assembly has convened a
national conference on April 29-30 on five main subjects: (1)
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Bilingual and Bicultural Education for Chinese Americans; (2)
Teaching English to Chinese Speakers; (3) Social Services and
Immigration Policies for Asian Americans; (4) Problems of
Immigrant Youth; and (5) A Review of United States-China
Relations. More than fifty papers will be published by the
Assembly when funds become available.
The Assembly is fortunate to have the participation of more
than one hundred distinguished leaders from fourteen states and
Washington, D.C. in business, education and community affairs
to formulate the first National Advisory Council (1977-1978).
Under the leadership of Mr. Henry Luce III and Judge William
Marutani of Philadelphia, the National Advisory Council includes
chairmen of several large corporations as well as owners of small
businesses, university administrators as well as chair professors
from thirty colleges and universities, and leaders from eighteen
diversified community organizations such as, China Institute in
America, Japan Society, as well as Jewish Community Council of
New York. We are also grateful to Prof. Harry H. L. Kitano,
UCLA, Prof. Jang H. Koo, University of Alaska at Fairbanks, and
Prof. William T. Liu, Director of Asian American Mental Health
Research Center at Chicago to serve as vice-chairmen and to
guide the activities of the Assembly in the years ahead.
The views expressed in the position papers on U.S.-China
relations (abstracts) are those of the authors and not those of the
Asian American Assembly or of the City College Fund or of the
Field Foundation, which as educational institutions take no
official position.
Winb.erg Chai
Chairman
N~w Yor~

City

THE MANCHUS AND THE YANKEES:
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND HISTORIANS
(Abstract)
T. K. Tong*
Having concluded a short review of the Sino-American
relations during the Manchu period, this writer still wonders how
much truth he has learned from the voluminous monographs
which he has consulted. With the exception of a handful of recent
titles by the younger academicians from the Institute of Modern
History, Academia Sinica, in Taipei, few of the Chinese-language
treatises covering this subject are worth serious exploration.
Sentimentalism and lack of research facilities in old China have
handicapped the Chinese scholarship in diplomatic studies. To
professional bibliographers, therefore, it seems that exhaustive
research on China's foreign relations of the early period has been
a monopoly of English-speaking authors. The voluminous
publications by the Harvard University Press alone certainly
finds no parity in China on either side of the Taiwan Street.
The chefs-d'oeuvre of the Western works on Chinese diplomacy, however, are by no means immune from bias. The most
serious of all is their inexorable approach to specific historical
events which has remained unchanged for ages. Linial writers
were merely searching for additional facts and coining new terms
to help prove the concepts that their forerunners had formulated
generations back.
From the middle of the last century, for instance, few
conventional writers were willing to accept the fact that the
principal cause of the Opium War was the narcotics trade. To
them, the Opium War was only a logical consequence of the
Manchu anticommercialism. Regardless of whatever commodities
were being traded, say opium or rice, an armed conflict between
China and the West was -inevitable.
This Opium-War-not-for-opium approach has been continued
by notable authors up to the present. But the latest development
in China has made thoughtful readers skeptical of the orthodox
wisdom. To compare Emperor Tao-kuang with Chairman Mao
Tse-tung, no historian may be able to state that the former was
more "anticommercial" than the latter. Yet when the latter closed
all the treaty-ports to Western traders and imposed numerous

*

Professor of Asian Studies at The City College of New York.
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"anticommercial" regulations on both the opium and the rice
trade, no foreign gunboats ever showed up in his deserted harbors.
It might be true, therefore, that the Opium War was not
fought for opium as the American War of Independence was not
fought for tea, but the principal cause of the Opium War was
evidently not Tao-kuang's anticommercialism; rather it was his
incapability to regulate his commerce by keeping the foreign
gunboats away from the Chinese territorial waters. The Americans were not involved in the early conflict with the Manchus. It
was simply because the Yankee "Expansionists" were not yet able
to cross the Pacific as they did successfully during the Spanish
War.
"Antiforeignism" was another term specifically coined by the
conventional authors to characterize the Chinese foreign relations
of the early period. Although the word has not been accepted by
the etymologists, it appears in almost every English-language
monograph relating to modem China. But the stories revealed by
these authors indicated only that Chinese antiforeignism was in
no way more serious than the foreign antiforeignism in China
during the corresponding periods. John Hay's Open Door was in
fact designed to combat the latter rather than the former. So were
the policies formulated by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft prior to
the outbreak of the First World War. Chinese antiforeignism,
including the boycott against American goods at the beginning of
this century, actually played a miniscule role in Sino-Western
relations, if it was not a pure legend.
The Boxer Rebellion, which was no more than a spontaneous
anti-Christian mass movement, has been frequently cited by
Western authors as an outstanding example of senseless antiforeignism in nineteenth century China. Here again, a recent
religious tournament performed by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon and
his Unification Church has rendered the conventional anti-Boxer
argument a meaningless statement. If the American parents could
find any justification today to "de-program" their youthful
Moonies, their Chinese counterpart were certainly more justified
to do the same in a Confucian society some hundred years ago. In
fact, the painful dislocation that the young Moonies have caused
to their parental society is in no way to compare with the damage
that the Christian missions had done to the society of China.
Moreover, few of the Western writers have ever attempted to
compare the Chinese antiforeignism with the anti-Chinese
movement in America during the same period. As the ManchuAmerican relations have constituted a unique piece of history, the
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two incidents were actually the two sides of one coin. The shortlived Boxer Rebellion did not seem to deserve more attention than
the Exclusionist Movement which has been totally neglected by
nearly all eminent diplomatic historians on this side of the
Pacific. Even for those who tend to treat the anti-Chinese racism
in America as an independent subject, they never hesitated to
apply the conventional Opium-War-not-for-opium approach to
their study of the "bitter strength." The Chinese-exclusion
movement was not directed against the Chinese workers, as one
recent writer has argued. It was provoked by the Chinese
unadaptability to the American way of life.
To read only the Western-language publications covering the
Sino-American relations, therefore, one cannot but believe that for
any wrong-doing on either side of the Pacific Ocean, only John
Chinaman was to be blamed. Leading writers in America are
rather firm in defending this century-old conclusion though some
also began to question their inherited wisdom. To them it seems to
be as true as the law of gravity, whereas untrained writers on the
other side of the ocean could only present their arguments with
some immatured research which are always coupled with
unnecessary sentimentalism. As a matter of fact, neither side was
immune from bigotry though masqueraded academicism is
definitely more malicious to the search of truth.
"It is better to know nothing than to know what ain't so," to
quote a saying from Josh Billings. When the diplomats are
talking about normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations, would it be a good time for scholars on both sides to think of
a normalization movement in academic circles?

RELATIONS WITH THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Abstracts)
Richard H. Yang*
The United States (US) is the first modern Republic of the
West, and the Republic of China (ROC) the first republic of the
East. Founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1912, the ROC has been a
well established cultural identity and longstanding vital political
entity for sixty-six years, not a political or cultural fiction as some
critics would like us to believe. Relations between the US and ROC
have gone through many crucial changes during the past six and
a half decades (1912-1977), they have always remained friends
and allies throughout war and peace. This is the China which has
been recognized by the US since 1928. This recognition has its
historical roots deeply seated in goodwill and mutual interests
which had existed long before that date. Also, this is the China
which now offers the only democratic alternative and cultural
aspiration for millions of Chinese throughout the world.
The roots of US-ROC relations have been seriously challenged
and the survival of the ROC threatened by some who seek to place
those relations and survival in serious jeopardy, ever since the
Nixon Administration dramatically altered the course of United
States policy toward China in 1972; now that policy is under
critical review by the Carter Administration.
The Carter Administration's advocacy of a moral principle in
foreign affairs raises serious questions regarding the extent to
which America practices segmented morality - taking a high
moral tone with some countries, while making capricious
exception for others? Inasmuch as the survival of the ROC is a
matter of serious concern to most Chinese Americans, therefore,
they have a legitimate interest to see whether the Carter
Administration will live_ up to its own commitment to link
preservation of human rights with foreign affairs, and whether
the US is permissively allowing the Chinese Communists to have
a free ride on the human rights-foreign affairs principle. Thus,
this paper attempts to review the historic relations and analyze
the policy options under the various American administrations.
Emphasis is plated on the political, military, economic and
cultural factors of questioning the wisdom of derecognition of the
* Professor of Chinese Studies at Washington University (St. Louis).
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Government of the ROC, and that of recognition of the Peking
regime.
I. US-ROC RELATIONS IN 1912-1927

On October 18, 1911, eight days after the successful revolution
of the Chinese Nationalists at Wuchang, Sun Yat-sen asked
Secretary of State Knox for a private meeting, but failed. Knox
also rejected American envoy Homer Lea's plea for America to be
first to recognize Sun's government, shortly after Sun became the
first President of Provisional Government at Nanking. Two
months later, Charles Tenny unofficially approached Sun and
maintained that the US desired to remain "neutrality throughout
the present struggle in China," but the Wilson Administration,
upon William J. Bryan's recommendation, chose to recognize the
Government of Yuan Shih-kai in 1913, and the ensuing warlord
governments in Peking after Yuan. Disappointed with foreign
indifference and frustrated with the lack of unity at home, Sun
was forced to seek support of the Soviet Union. In 1925, Sun died
without seeing the fulfillment of his lifelong aspiration for a
unified modern Chinese republic under democracy, independence
and prosperity. Despite that he was a great democrat with a
genuine appreciation for American democracy, Sun was unable in
his lifetime to gain American support or recognition for his
Provisional Government at Nanking in 1912 and his Revolutionary Government at Canton in 1917.
On the international front, the US was preoccupied with
European affairs, but had displayed a policy prejudicial to Japan
over the Sino-Japanese disputes. The Wilson Administration
declared the famous Fourteen Points on the one hand, but
legitimatized the Japanese special interests in China by signing
the Ishii-Lansing Agreement in 1917. Faced with Japan's
insatiable ambition and growing military might, Secretary
Hughes made a great effort at the Washington Conference to
revive the moribund open door policy through the Nine-Power
Treaty demanding Japan, along with other signatory powers, to
respect the "sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China" by withdrawing the Japanese
troops from Shantung.
During the same period, the May Fourth Movement, the rise
of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the KMT-CCP detente, the
death of Sun Yat-sen, the KMT-CCP schism, May Thirtieth
Incident, and the KMT's Northern Expedition Campaign had all
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contributed to China's political awareness and determination to
strive for national independence and international respectability.
However, the US-ROC relations still remained relatively unimportant to the over-all foreign policy of the US.
II. US-ROC RELATIONS IN 1928-1936

During this period, relations between the two nations were
generally improved but still somewhat shadowed by America's
reluctance to challenge Japan's grand strategy on China.
Following the KMT's successful Northern Expedition Campaign,
the US signed a protocol in March 1928 and formally recognized
the Nationalist Government of the ROC.
In order to effectuate her grand strategy against China,
Japan chose to defy the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929) which
outlawed war as an instrument of diplomacy, and launched an
invasion against Manchuria on September 18, 1931. The infamy
of the Mukden Incident aggravated US-Japan relations and
became the prelude to the eight-year War of Resistance in 1937;
and to Pearl Harbor in 1941. In response to the Chinese
Government's appeal, Secretary Stimson declared the famous
Non-recognition Doctrine which constitutes a long-standing and
formidable challenge to the legality of international conquest by
force. Meanwhile, the League of Nations approved the Lytton
Report and passed an economic sanction against Japan.
But Japan's reaction to Stimson's non-recognition doctrine
was the installation of puppet Manchukuo with Henry Pu Yi as its
emperor in 1932. In defiance to the League's Resolution, Japan
withdrew from the League and continued to step up its military
attack. In 1934, the Japanese Foreign Minister Koki Hirota
proclaimed the Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" for East Asia. It was
followed by another Amau Statement, arrogating to Japan "the
entire burden of responsibility for the preservation of peace in the
Far East as her 'divine mission.' "
In facing the Japanese military conquest of China in the
name of the so-called "Co-Prosperity Sphere," the United States
was handicapped by domestic economic crisis and contained by
its own powerful opposition of the isolationists through a series of
Neutrality Acts. Moreover, Hull's own stress on "Europe first" in
foreign policy had in fact delayed US confrontation with Japan in
the Far East. President Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech had no
teeth, and the American Government's moral outrage was no
deterrent. Japan's rampant aggression went unchallenged. In the
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meantime, the Chinese Government worked hard for consolidating its political strength at home and endeavored to abolish all of
the unequal treaties throughout the strenuous decade. In July, the
US was first among the foreign powers to sign a new SinoAmerican Tariff Treaty abrogating America's special privilege in
the management of customs administration of China.
III. US-ROC RELATIONS IN 1937-1945

The Sino-American relations in 1928-1936 was impaired by a
series of US impotent and redundant proclamation of moralistic
platitude. It was equally true during the first four years of China's
eight-year War of Resistance 1937-1945 that the United States
Government would provide little material help except for expressing its sincere sympathy for China's predicament and war
sufferings. It was the Russians who provided China's sorely
needed war supplies in the beginning of the war, while American
merchants still sold shiploads of steel scrap to the Japanese
aggressors.
In summary, during the first four years of China's resistance,
her perserverance had won a moral and diplomatic victory and the
Chinese Government of the ROC under the leadership of Chiang
Kai-shek refused to negotiate the Japanese peace overtures.
Because of China's refusal to surrender, Japan was forced into an
expensive but hopeless war of attrition. This singular contribution
of the ROC to the entire war effort among its allies should neither
be conveniently forgotten nor expediently obliterated. It was very
crucial, however, for the Government of the ROC to secure the US
moral support during the initial phase of China's struggle and the
US Government did exactly just that.
As the war entered 1941, Japan expanded its invasion in IndoChina and the Southeast Asia, the crisis quickened. In April1941,
the US Government rejected the so-called "World Peace Plan"
proposed by Japan calling for the demilitarization British and
American naval forces in the Pacific, US withdrawal to Hawaii as
well as inclusion of Australia and New Zealand into the CoProsperity Sphere. Instead, the US Government offered Japan a
modus vivendi, provided that Japan halted her further advances
in Indo-China, and recognized the National Government of the
ROC at Chungking. But the Japanese Imperial Conference had
already made the decision on September 6 to prepare for war
against the United States.
In the wake of the Pearl Harbour attack on December 7, 1941,
China and the United States formally declared war on Japan. The
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war against Japan was no longer China's sole burden. During the
second four-year war phase, the following aspects merit special
attention: (1) China's role in the China-Burma-India Theatre was
compromised under the Anglo-American pursuit of a "Europe first
and Asia second" war strategy. China was a full partner in the
war, but a secondary ally in the alliance. The America's
overriding aim in the Pacific War Theatre was to "keep China in
the war, and so to strengthen her that she might exact a
constantly growing price from the Japanese invader." In the end,
China did play a fair share in both fighting the war and defeating
the Japanese. It must be remembered that it was under the
government of the ROC that China stood up and will never be
bullied again! (2) the tragic episode of Stilwell had acerbated and
marred US-ROC relations for many years. According to John
Davis, "He (Stilwell) was removed because Chiang could not
accept a foreigner taking command of all Chinese forces. It was
inevitable and an entirely unrealistic concept." To this date, the
ROC Government is still paying a terrible price for the bitter
lesson; (3) the US had enjoyed the full advantages of extraterritor·
iality and related rights in China for more than four decades
(1901-1943). It was the Chinese people and the government who
had earned respect and recognition among nations for their war
efforts through a protracted War of Resistance. In demonstrating
the US goodwill to "correct an historic mistake" and to show
additional proof that the US wanted China not only as a "partner
in waging war" but also as a "partner of peace," the US signed a
treaty in relinquishing US extraterritoriality in 1943; (4) the US
recognized that to keep the ROC in the war was indispensable to
ultimate allied victory, and that it was logical for the US to build
up China's world status early so that China would be able to play
an important world role to fill the power gap left by Japan during
the post-war period so as to maintain the political stability in the
Pacific region vis-a-vis the rising influence in Asia. As a result,
China was invited to sign the Declaration of Four Nations on
General Security in 1943 and to participate in the Cairo
Conference in the same year. Despite those efforts to help China
to gain great power status, paradoxically, the United States
unwittingly compromised her Samaritan diplomacy by concluding
a secret agreement with the Russians at Yalta on February 11,
1945, and deliberately kept China uninformed of it for several
months.
The ignominious Yalta Agreement is a classical example of
an act by the US Government, irrespective of its rhetoric
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plausibility of moralistic diplomacy, chose to defend its own
national interest, i.e., to invite the Russians to enter the war
against Japan, to shorten the war and save American lives, at the
expense of China. It is paradoxical for the US to help China to
drive out one aggressor on the one hand, but force China to accept
another aggressor on the other hand. The Yalta Agreement had
deprived the ROC's real opportunity of replacing Japan as a
major stabilizing power in the Far East, because it led to the
Communist take-over of China. Instead of rectifying the historic
blunder, the US Government is now going to legitimatize the
communist regime at the expense of the ROC under a specious
pretext and wishful logic that the Peking-Moscow schism proved
communism to be no longer monolithic and that pragmatism must
take precedence of all policy considerations. In retrospect, the selfserving and casuistic contention of US infallibility in the Yalta
tragedy in connection with US-ROC relations must be challenged.
IV. US-ROC RELATIONS 1946-1950

For more than sixty years since 1895, China has been
confronted with the dual threat of Russian and Japanese
aggression in rotation. Mter the Japanese surrender in 1945, a
new Russian aggression intensified. Although the ROC had
emerged from the victory a nominal great power, in fact she had
been plagued by civil strifes, morbid bureaucracy, economic crises,
social disorder, political disunity and the Communist rebellion.
Under the circumstances, the ROC Government was unable to
devote itself to the post-war reconstruction. The Chinese Communists expanded their forces during the war and after, and were
ready to challenge the Government by force; they were portrayed
by many Americans as agrarian reformers and a new dynamic
democratic force of a new China to be reckoned with. The KMTCCP struggle was viewed as civil war, not as part of Stalin's
grand strategy of contrived conquest of China.
Rational dialogues on the US policy toward China are rare.
Apprehension, acrimony and sometimes hostility existing among
many American and Chinese leaders had turned the US-ROC
relations into the darkest era in 1946-1949. Many US leaders
legislated their own pathological predilections and substituted it
for national policy in the name of objective national interests. The
complexity and intricacy of the eventful post-war US-ROC
relations almost defy any sensible simplification in a short time. I
can only use the following important cases to summarize the
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development of US-ROC relations during this landmark phase of
Chinese modern history.
(1) The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 upon the
US-ROC Relations: The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 which was
the direct result of the Yalta Agreement imposed on the ROC, has
brutalized China's national honor for years. As a college student
who witnessed the grassroot indignation toward the Yalta
Agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty, I took part in many
massive student demonstration protesting the Soviet aggression
and the US connivance. To this day, regardless of their political
persuasions, most Chinese would agree that the Yalta tragedy did
put the credibility of American Samaritan Diplomacy in serious
jeopardy. No thinking Chinese of my generation would seriously
consider that the United States can be a reliable or potentially
credible ally at a time of crisis. Credibility gap resulted from the
Yalta Infamy of the United States has become a big boulder
standing in the way of improving the US-ROC relations for years
to come.
(2) The Debacle of the Marshall Mission: Immediately after
the war ended in 1945, the ROC was faced with two options of
regrettable necessities, either securing the US cooperation or the
Russian aid, to go about her post-war reconstruction. Each of such
options would potentially impair and compromise China's selfreliance effort to a certain degree. But, in order to minimize the
latent trauma inflicted upon China by either of these options, the
ROC chose to cooperate with the US. At the outset, the Marshall
was beset with insoluble complexity of entangled political,
military and economic problems. On December 15, 1945, in the
midst of a deepening Chinese crisis and intensifying military
hostilities, President issued a China policy statement calling for a
"strong, united, and democratic China" as of utmost importance
to world peace, so that China would be able to discharge
responsibilities for post-war domestic reconstruction as well as for
maintaining international stability and world peace. General
Marshall was instructed by the President "to bring to bear the
influence of the US to the end that unification of China by
peaceful and democratic methods." After thirteen months of futile
effort and bitter frustration, Marshall failed his mission and
resigned. In facing the expanded Communist military attack, the
United States, now with Marshall as the new Secretary of State,
would preside over a new disengaged policy toward the beleaguered Government of the ROC.
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(3) Segmented Bipartisan Foreign Policy toward China: The China crisis culminated in the 80th Congress when a
divided government between a Republican-controlled Congress
and a Democratic-occupied White House carried on its foreign
policy toward China along the segmented bipartisanship. Senator
Arthur H. Vandenberg, architect of the segmented bipartisan
foreign policy, strongly advocated China's freedom of choice to
remain as a democratic republic, and openly disassociated from
the Administration's China policy on coalition government, but
did not challenge the Administration's hands-off policy toward
China and agreed to exclude the US policy China from his
bipartisanship in foreign affairs. Thus, Vandenberg's segmented
bipartisanship toward China became a tragic policy by default.
His full bipartisan commitment to support the Marshall Plan may
have saved Western Europe from a Soviet take-over, but his
segmented bipartisan foreign policy certainly did invalidate the
US Samaritan diplomacy of preventing the Communist take-over
of China. At the critical moment of fighting for its survival in
1949, the ROC Government was dealt with several fatal blows.
The most important is the release of the White Paper on US Policy
toward China. The loss of China was attributed by the Americans
to the ROC's lacking of "will to resist."
As things stood prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the
Truman Administration excluded Taiwan and Korea from the
first line of US defense in the Western Pacific. Secretary Dean
Acheson reaffirmed the US hand-off China policy and warned the
new Asian nations that they must have the "will to fight
communism" themselves before the US could offer them economic
aid and advice. Ironically, in 1977, twenty-eight years after the
China debacle, the ROC is now again faced with perhaps the most
critical challenge and test of the US commitment to the SinoAmerican Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. At this time, if the
Carter Administration chooses to abandon the ROC through
derecognition, the ROC should not be blamed for lacking of the
"will to fight for its own survival". No amount of casuistic
paralogism and specious rationalization will change the fact that
the Carter Administration simply did forsake the ROC for the
sake of playing the power politics of using Peking against Moscow
at the expense of the ROC.
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US-ROC RELATIONS FROM THE KOREAN WAR TO THE
FORD ADMINISTRATION 1950-1976

(1) The Truman Administration: Two days after the
outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman altered his handsoff China policy dramatically by ordering the Seventh Fleet to
patrol the Taiwan Straits in order to prevent the Chinese
Communists from attacking Taiwan. The Korean War not only
altered the US policy in Asia in general, but also turned a new leaf
on US-ROC relations for the next two decades. For the first time,
the US containment policy began to apply in restraining the
Chinese Communists. By dismissing General MacArthur, the US
warned the ROC that they should not entertain any false hope of
expecting the US to help them to regain the Chinese mainland via
the Korean War. Meantime, the US gradually resumed limited
military and economic aids afterward. The Truman Administration was committed to support the ROC seat at the United
Nations and backed the ROC's complaint in the UN against
Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists and the Russians' violation
of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance.
(2) The Eisenhower Administration: The Eisenhower Administration with John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State
marked considerable changes in the US-ROC relations: A.
appointment of a new U.S. ambassador to the ROC; B. strong
defense of the ROC against the Chinese Communists attack on
Taiwan; C. signing of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty
in 1954 as sign of considering the ROC as a crucial part of the US
global collective security defense chain; D. support of the ROC's
UN seat and reaffirmation of non-recognition of the Chinese
Communist regime in Peking; E. nascent concept of Two-China
policy as advanced by the Colon Report in November 1959 and the
Rockefeller Panel Report in 1960, with indication that the
Eisenhower Administration would readjust its present policies if
the situation "in the Far East were so to change in its basic
elements as to call for a radically different evaluation of the threat
Chinese Communist policies pose to the US;" F. initiation of the
Washington-Peking bilateral talk: the focal point of such talks
was to ascertain the principle of renouncement of force in settling
Peking-Taipei dispute. In summary, the pattern of US-ROC
relations based on the de facto Two-China Policy was sanctioned
by the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. The US would not tolerate
military attacks by either the ROC or the Chinese Communists
against each other.
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(3) The Kennedy Administration: At first, the Kennedy
Administration vowed to switch from the Dulles' brinkmanship of
massive retaliation in foreign policy to the New Frontier policy of
flexible response and advocated a break in the impasse of the USROC policy. Despite its assurances of "defending Formosa
whatever the risk, and whatever the costs," the Administration
kept its options open should the Chinese Communists modify their
policies. Clearly, the nomalization between Washington and
Peking was no longer blocked by the opposition of the ROC, but
rather by the increasing Communist belligerent attitude. During
the short period of the Kennedy Administration, one still can
identify some of the positive developments in US-ROC relations:
A. re-emphasis on the strategic importance of Taiwan as crucial to
US security in the Western Pacific; B. considering the Chinese
representation question in the UN as "important substantive
question;" C. US continued support for the defense of the offshore
islands held by the ROC; D. in view of the Peking-Moscow schism,
the Kennedy Administration set another important pattern in
dealing with the Chinese Communists, i.e., the Chinese Communists must change and reciprocate. The change of US policy
toward Peking was contingent upon such a reciprocal change by
the Peking regime. But Peking did little to reciprocate. Besides,
the Chinese Communists' cartoon caricature of Kennedy as "kenni-ti" ("bite muddy ground", derogatory transliteration of
Kennedy's name in Chinese), and their uncharacteristic jubilation
over the Kennedy's assassination certainly did not win the Peking
regime many friends.
(4) The Johnson Administration: President Johnson developed a two-track policy toward the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC
on the mainland. As for the former, his administration was to
follow the principles laid down by previous administrations after
1949, namely, a continued recognition of the ROC, support of the
ROC seat at the UN, and a firm commitment to the US-ROC
Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. On the other hand, a new
policy toward Peking was formulated, i.e., "containment without
isolation" and a "new open door policy." In the historical sense,
President Johnson was the last American President to defend the
containment policy, and Dean Rusk the last Secretary of State to
execute that policy. Assistant Secretary Roger Hilsman, Jr.
signaled a basic change in the Johnson Administration's policy
toward Peking by telling the Commonwealth Club of San
Francisco: "US defense of Formosa is a matter of basic principle,"
and "no basic improvement in US-Chinese relations is possible
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until Communist China accepts that fact." However, Hilsman
declared officially a Two-China policy by saying: "The US is
determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change in
Communist China and will not slam it shut against any
developments which might advance our national good, serve the
free world, and benefit the people of China." Furthermore, Dean
Rusk outlined new policy guidelines in dealing with Peking: First,
to assure Peking publicly and candidly that the US did not intend
to attack mainland China; second, not to assume the existence of
"unending and inevitable state of hostility" between Washington
and Peking; third, to gradually expand the categories of American
travel, cultural exchanges, trade, mail and other communications;
fourth, to hold diplomatic discussions with Peking on the critical
problems of disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Obviously, the Johnson Administration was impressed with
the gains in nuclear weaponry by Peking in the midst of truculant
Cultural Revolution and increasingly acrimonious Peking-Moscow
schism. It was difficult indeed for the ROC and a good portion of
the American people to appreciate the logic and moral justification for considering a Two-China policy. Logic and morality
aside, ally or no ally, the Johnson Administration stood ready in
1969 to accommodate and reciprocate whatever and whenever
Peking was willing to cooperate. Unfortunately, treaty or no
treaty obligation, the ROC was helplessly and anxiously kept
waiting on the sideline.
(5) The Nixon-Ford Administrations: The ROC Government was keenly aware of the full significance of the gradual
change in US policy, but took comfort in assuming that if the
dramatic change of policy did not take place under Democratic
Administrations, it will be unlikely that the Republican Administration will make any radical change. But the ROC's optimistic
assumption turned out to be premature and complacent when
Nixon made the historic and dramatic visit to Peking in 1972. The
Nixon trip sent a shock wave throughout the world and had a
devastating impact upon the people and government of the ROC.
In fact, as early as October 1967, Nixon wrote in Foreign Affairs
calling for a flexible policy toward Peking. In his first State of the
Union Message, President Nixon advocated "an era of negotiation" in substitution for "an era of confrontation." Between 1969
and 1971, Nixon made several overtures to Peking through
various channels. Trade and travel restrictions were eased, the
Nixon Doctrine principally aiming at Peking was proclaimed. The
leaders of the ROC visited the US in 1970 urging the Nixon
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Administration not to put its Two-China policy into immediate
effect. But no matter, the Nixon Administration went ahead with
its Two-China policy. In a banquet to honor the visiting
Romanian Chief of State, Nixon referred for the first time to the
"People's Republic of China," and stated in September, 1970 "If
there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China." In
December, Nixon told the press conference: "Looking long toward
the future we must have some communications and eventually
relations with Communist China." The carefully orchestrated
"ping-pong diplomacy" in 1971 was a prelude to the happenings of
a chain of events. Following the secret talk between Henry
Kissinger and Chou En-lai in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971,
President Nixon announced on July 15 that he had accepted the
Chinese Communists' invitation for a visit to Peking. US-ROC
relations strained considerably after the Nixon announcement.
On August 2, 1971, Secretary Rogers officially endorsed a dual
Chinese representation at the UN. On October 25, 1971, the China
question was voted on in the General Assembly, Henry Kissinger's ostenatious presence in Peking sent a clear message to the
world. The ROC had no choice but protected its national honor by
walking out of the UN. On February 27, 1972, the Nixon-Chou
Shanghai Communique was issued after Nixon's visit came to an
end. The Communique covered a wide range of bilateral question.
The focal point still rested on the Taiwan question. Each side
reaffirmed its respective position on Taiwan. The US acknowledged all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits maintain
there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Peking
insisted that Taiwan is a province of China and that settlement of
Taiwan question is a matter of China's internal affair. The US
stated that it was merely concerned with a peaceful settlement of
the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves, and that its
ultimate objective US withdrawal and progressive reduction of
military installation on Taiwan as the tension in the area
diminished. Thus, the objective of normalization was agreed upon,
but definite schedule for effectuation was not set. In 1973,
Washington and Peking had exchanged Liaison Offices. By
setting a diplomatic and historic precedent in stationing one legal
embassy at Taipei, the ROC, and a de facto mission in Peking, the
US officially instituted a formula of its own, quite different from
the German formula or Japanese model. Despite all official
assurances that nothing was done "at the expense of the old
friends," the US was very careful not to offend Peking, President
Nixon and Kissinger were inaccessible to the ROC diplomats.

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

21

In the wake of the Nixon Administration's somersault policy
on China, a diplomatic avalanche followed. More than 60 nations
recognized the Government of the ROC before Nixon's trip, but
that figure has steadily come down to reach 23 in 1977. But the
ROC took the Nixon shock and diplomatic setbacks in a sober
stride. She quietly and effectively withstood the diplomatic
isolation, international boycott and economic hardship from 1972
to 1975.
During the Ford Administration, no substantive progress was
made toward normalization after Ford's trip to Peking in 1975.
The Administration ruefully discovered that Teng who held talks
with Ford, was again disgraced shortly after Chou En-lai died in
January 1976. Mao's invitation of Nixon to visit with him after
Nixon's resignation from the Presidency certainly did not do
either one any good, particularly during an election year in 1976.
After Mao died in September 1976, a new political power struggle
erupted. On the contrary, when the ROC lost its leader, Chiang
Kai-shek in April 1975, there was no leadership crisis but a
peaceful and institutional transition of power. Being perplexed
and vexed with the capricious power struggles on the mainland,
the Ford Administration quickly realized that indiscreetness in
dealing with Peking in the midst of political turmoil and
leadership instability will neither serve the best interests of the
United States, nor save the US from policy embarrassment later
on. As a result, except for following the Nixon-Kissinger basic
policy on China, President Ford's policy was a holding action and
waited for an election victory to effectuate whatever the new
policy as planned. But, Ford lost the election as well as an
opportunity to implement his new policy toward China.
V. RE-EXAMINATION OF THE CHINA POLICY OPTIONS UNDER
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, 1977

As of April 30, 1977, President Carter has been in office less
than four months. The President is primarily occupied with
domestic issues and other key foreign problems concerning the
SALT II talks with the Soviet Union, and the Middle East crisis.
Despite ·the President's initial statement on the China question
that the US would continue to proceed with the normalization on
the basis of the Shanghai Communique and that the security of
the ROC on Taiwan must be guaranteed, nevertheless, the whole
question requires more time for careful review and re-evaluation.
Ever since President Carter injected the human rights issue into
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the foreign policy of his Administration, normalization with
Peking could be complicated by increasing criticism of the
President's subtle silence on the brutal violation of the Chinese
people's human rights under the Chinese Communist slavocracy,
or by Peking's own insistence on no written pledge of nonbelligerency toward settlement of the Taiwan question. With
regard to the future of US-ROC relations, suggestions abound but
options are limited. For example: 1. continued support for the
ROC: Taiwan is strategically vital to the US defense perimeter in
the Western Pacific. Those who disputed Taiwan's strategic
importance to the US security in the Far East, are either
understating their political perception or over-exaggerating their
prejudicial preference; 2. derecognition of the ROC and recognition of Peking as the sole legitimate government of China: By
doing so, the US has to give in to Peking's three preconditions,
severance of U.S. diplomatic relations with the ROC, abrogation
of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty and the removal of US troops
and bases from the ROC. The difficulty with this option is that the
US itself is scuttling her written pledge to the ROC, how can the
US expect the shrewd Chinese Communists to make a new pledge
in writing and to keep it in deed? Besides, it is utterly unfair and
immoral for the US to betray its own commitment to individual
liberty and democratic value by acting as a political mortician for
the Chinese Communists' liberation of Taiwan by proxy? 3. Openend policy: This is also called Two-China policy. Like others, it
carries with it certain deficiencies. But at least, the US still holds
on to its own initiative and independent freedom of policy making
option. Recently, suggestions were made in some quarters that a
possible military cooperation between Peking and Washington
should be probed further. Despite the Peking-Moscow schism,
neither Peking nor Moscow chose to abrogate the Sino-Russo
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1950, why should American military aid
become the Chinese Communists' welfare at the expense of its
allies? And why should the ROC be put in double jeopardy?
In the process of policy evaluation, it is important to take the
following three aspects into considerations: First, Peking has set
the preemptive and non-negotiable conditions for normalization
between Washington and Peking. In seeking to place their
negotiating opponents on the defensive from the outset, the
Chinese Communists have always insisted that their negotiation
agenda be considered as a set of conclusions; second, US-Peking
negotiations for normalization are not merely bilateral undertakings, the entire security and peace in the East Asia region is
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involved. Above all, it is the creditability of the United States as
treaty partner under challenge; third, the people and the
government of the ROC have rejuvenated in the past three
decades since 1949. They have done nothing at all to compel the
United States to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty and to
derecognize them. If the Carter Administration chooses to accept
the Chinese Communists' preconditions as the price for normalization for the sheer sake of normalization with Peking, then the
US Government can no longer disavow responsibility for
abandoning the people and the government of the ROC. It is
unconscionable for the United States to legitimatize the Chinese
Communists' birth right to claim that all Chinese must live under
the Communist system against their volition. The United States
has no moral obligation to "liberate the ROC" and destroy the
sixteen million people's freedom of existence for Peking by proxy.
The Carter Administration's China policy must not be arbitrary,
inhumane or Machiavellian. It must not be assumed that the ROC
will disappear after derecognition and that the US has no
responsibility for destabilizing the security and power equilibrium
in the Pacific region.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

US-ROC relations have been long and good. As a loyal and
self-reliant ally in war and in peace, the ROC has proved its
political integrity, economic viability, cultural sublimity and its
will of survival to its own people and to the world. It was the
United States which has insisted on that China must be
democratic. After three decades of nation building effort, the ROC
on Taiwan has become a huge reservoir of unusual talents and
human resources. It has become the seed plant of China's hope for
democracy, and the symbol of cultural mecca of millions of
overseas Chinese throughout the world. The ROC is the most
acknowledged member of international community who is
peaceful, constructive and capable of receiving and sharing much
scientific and cultural knowledge among nations.
During the 200 years of US history, no single mutual defense
treaty has been unilaterally or arbitrarily nullified for the sake of
the adversary who has long sought to destroy the very signatory
party of such mutual defense pact purported to protect. The people
and government of the ROC have stated repeatedly that they are
grateful to the people and government of the United States for
their generous support given to them, but the US must exercise no
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diplomatic moral relativism or selective human rights standards.
It is about time for the US to treat the ROC as her own ally
instead of treating her as "helpless pawns" in the world of
Machiavellian power politics. The US must stop her patronizing
attitude and condescending arrogance toward her ally, the ROC.
No amount of casuistic rhetorics and pragmatic palliatives will
prove that the China question can be effectively and realistically
resolved by the US' unilateral concession and permissive
condonation toward Peking. The United States may not adopt an
anti-communist policy, but the Carter Administration should
never adopt a pro-communist policy by sacrificing the legitimate
freedom of survival of her ally. No secret deals should be made to
Peking at the expense of the ROC. Besides, during the period of
detente, the President's war powers have been considerably
weakened by the passage of the War Powers Act of 1973 and the
National Emergencies Act of 1976. I submit that the American
Presidency cannot afford to be further constrained by the
abrogation of the most trust-worthy US-ROC Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1954, should the Chinese Communists make a feigned
non-belligerent pledge as an inducement for US recognition, and
then resort to military attack on the ROC.

RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Abstract)
Y. C. CHANG*
Since Richard Nixon reopened the door to China in 1972, there
has been a great deal of expectation regarding the improvement of
relations with the PRC. Yet, in the public discussion of the issue's
pros and cons, both its proponents and opponents have assumed
cavalier, parochial attitudes, despite the gravity of the matter. As
a result, complex questions have been oversimplified to the point
of distortion, and casual impressions given as irrefutable facts. To
clarify some of the confusion now permeating official and
academic circles, as well as the general public, it is essential to
scrutinize some of the crucial misconceptions.
MEANING OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE

The Shanghai Communique is invariably cited in any
discussion on Sino-American rapprochement, yet "so many people
talk about it without reading it." Some China scholars advocate
normalization because they think it is "promised" in the
Shanghai Communique, when in fact, only the hope that "new
prospects" would be opened up was expressed. Actually, the
communique is a statement of disagreements- all relating to the
Republic of China. The United States declared that it
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan
Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is
part of China. The United States Government does not
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese
themselves.
The Chinese Communists reaffirmed:
The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the
normalization of relations between China and the United
States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is
the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of
China which has long been returned to the motherland; the
liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no
other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces
and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan.

*

Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Delaware.

26

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Furthermore, proponents of normalization have even less
reason for regarding the Shanghai Communique as a sacrosanct
agreement. The State Department has repeatedly denied its legal
as well as moral binding force upon either the Ford or subsequent
administrations. Walter McConaughy put it aptly that "as a rule,"
a communique "is just a bland document consisting of platitudes
and hardly remembered even by the signers or the drafters two
days afterwards."
NORMALIZATION AS A MEANS OF INFLUENCING CHINESE
INTERNAL POLITICS

A CIA analyst, among others, has urged normalization in
order to influence the internal politics of China by strengthening
the position of one factional group over another. He fails to realize
that the United States has little reliable data about foreign policy
cleavages among Chinese leaders to "play upon their differences."
Communist Chinese sources have amply demonstrated that their
leaders may differ on tactics to accomplish the goal of SinoAmerican detente, but not on the goal itself, which, if realized,
would pay off handsomely. The Nationalist government would be
dealt a mortal blow, its alliance with the United States broken,
and the United States could be exploited as a shield against the
Soviet Union. The Chinese leadership, regardless of which faction
dominates, will not easily give up such a grand strategy as long
as there is a reasonable hope of success.
NORMALIZATION TO PREVENT A SINO-SOVIET RE-ALLIANCE

The prediction that Peking, after the death of Mao, would
again lean toward the Soviet Union has so far been proven
groundless. A careful study of the origins of the Sino-Soviet
dispute shows that the improvement of relations between the two
countries, even if possible, would be "limited" at best, since what
has undermined their relationship is more than a personality
clash between Mao and Soviet leaders, or their ideological
differences regarding the correct interpretation of MarxismLeninism. Rather, it is the deep-rooted, complicated boundary
controversy. On territorial questions, the Soviet Union has stood
adamant and inflexible, not only with the People's Republic, but
also with Japan on negotiations concerning the Kuriles. Until a
compromise requiring substantial concessions by both can be
reached, any chance for a genuine rapprochement between Peking
and Moscow seems slim indeed.
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Peking, however, has a more valid reason to worry about the
American pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union. It has openly
complained that the United States does not comprehend the true
nature of the "new czars," and on occasion has provocatively
intimated that the United States is no longer a superpower worthy
of contention. A major reason for inviting James Schlesinger to
the PRC, during which he was taken on an unprecedented tour of
the regions bordering the Soviet Union, was undoubtedly the
desire of the PRC to show support for his tough policies towards
Moscow. The Chinese Communists are also not totally unaware of
the fact that the United States can and may use Peking as one
form of "leverage" 56 over the Soviet Union, and Peking is jittery
about such a sellout. Under these circumstances, the practicality
of the United States in pursuing policies of detente simultaneously
with two antagonists is questionable, no matter how attractive the
objective may be in the abstract. In the short run, the United
States may be able to play one against the other, but in the long
run, it must make a choice, because in pleasing one, the United
States will inevitably offend the other.
NORMALIZATION AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

In the Shanghai Communique, the United States "reaffirms
its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the
Chinese themselves," but such an outcome seems very unlikely.
For the People's Republic, Taiwan is a question of principle on
which, like similar problems with India and the Soviet Union,
they cannot compromise. They have never ceased to state publicly
that "we shall liberate Taiwan, by force if necessary." For the
Nationalists, any talk about "reunification" with the mainland
·would invite internal rebellion among the 16.6 million
inhabitants, mainlanders and Taiwanese alike, who
overwhelmingly oppose such a move on understandable grounds
such as, among others, the relative prosperity and freedom in
comparison with the prevailing conditions on the mainland.
Some advocates of Sino-American rapprochement have urged
normalization before "peaceful settlement," which would entail
derecognition of the Republic of China and annulment of the
Mutual Defense Treaty. They fail to take into account some ofthe
desperate measures to which Taiwan might resort for the sake of
self-preservation. First, the ROC, denied American protection,
must explore every avenue to strengthen its defense, including the
possibility of "going nuclear." Having been excluded from the

28

CoNTEMPORARY

AsiAN

STUDIES SERIES

International Atomic Energy Agency membership in 1972, the
ROC has, nevertheless, observed the provisions of the nonproliferation treaty, and denied any intention to develop nuclear
weapons, but whether or not the Republic of China or South Korea
will develop nuclear weapons, as one commentator observed,
will, to a large extent, depend on American actions since they
are dependent on U.S. security guarantees. If trust in the U.S.
security guarantee erodes, the pressure to acquire nuclear
weapons is likely to increase.
Second, the ROC may be forced to seek rapprochement with
the Soviet Union. Several sources have already revealed that in
1973, the Soviet Union sent Victor Louis to Taiwan to negotiate
the lease of naval facilities in the Pescadores, but he was flatly
refused by Chiang Kai-shek. Soviet interest in naval bases in the
China Sea extends as far back as 1958, when Khrushchev first
approached Mao Tse-tung about the possibility of leasing Chinese
ports and was embarrassingly rebuffed. Given Russia's present
policy of expansion into the Indian Ocean, Taiwan's air and
naval bases presently occupied by the Americans are extremely
attractive indeed.
U.S. CREDIBILITY AS AN ALLY

To derecognize the Republic of China and annul the Mutual
Defense Treaty would immediately jeopardize American
credibility as an ally. For decades, the French have wondered if
the United States would risk the destruction of New York in order
to save Paris and, after the Vietnam fiasco, many members of
NATO have begun to harbor similar doubts. In Asia, the "Nixon
shock" prompted the Japanese to recognize the PRC hurriedly,
and other countries, including previously staunch antiCommunist governments, quickly followed suit as soon as they
saw the handwriting on the wall. Even South Korea has
conducted secret negotiations with Peking in Hong Kong, for no
one wants to be left holding the bag.
In the immediate future, the United States needs the
cooperation and support of Japan in maintaining order and
stability in the Pacific region. American withdrawal from
Vietnam has already "raised serious doubts in Japan ... as to
the credibility of the American guarantee," and the Japanese
have been alarmed by "the occasional refusal of Congress in
recent years to appropriate adequate funds to back up American
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commitments abroad." Ohira, the pro-Peking foreign minister
who was instrumental in Japan's hasty recognition of the
People's Republic, and other Japanese leaders candidly told
Senator Mike Mansfield in July 1976 that Japan regretted rushing
into recognition, that Japan's economic and cultural ties with the
ROC, after the former's recognition of Peking, were mainly
possible because of the American defense guarantee of Taiwan,
and finally, that the United States should move cautiously in
normalizing relations. If America ignores this advice, Fakuda, the
present premier whose pro-Taiwan sympathies are well known,
may be deeply annoyed. What the Japanese would do if they no
longer trusted the American guarantee is anybody's guess: They
would certainly strengthen their offensive as well as defensive
military capability; they might develop closer relations with the
Soviet Union, which they have hesitated to offend, as seen by
their refusal to sign the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty because
of its "anti-hegemony" clause; or they might even acquire nuclear
weapons. The United States, and particularly the People's
Republic, would not like to see these things happen.
The United States one day might also need the support of
other Asian countries in dealing with the PRC - a possibility,
however remote, that no pragmatist should completely rule out,
and Americans might find few willing to undertake the risk of
offending Peking. The United States has acted like a big brother
in the past, willing and able to persuade, cajole, and pressure
Asian countries to forego the pursuit of their national interests for
the benefit of all. Without ~mch mediation, Asia could easily
become a powder keg, with far-reaching consequences. When
American dominance in Asia is undermined, so is the stability of
Asia.
INTERNATIONAL MORALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

In many parts ofthe world, the United States is respected and
admired no less for its . moral commitment to high idealistic
aspirations - "national self-determination," fair play, and
decency in the relations among countries - than for its military
and economic might. In derecognizing the Republic of China and
annulling the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States will be
hard put to find a moral justification for the desertion of a
dependable long-time ally and the precedent of breaking a treaty
for the sake of expediency. To ignore the aspirations of 16 million
people in Taiwan and force their "integration" with the Chinese
Communists is equally indefensible. After all, less than a year
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ago, Ford expressed the indignation of all Americans when
Canada knuckled under the pressure of the PRC and disallowed
the participation of ROC athletes in the Olympic games. Upon
taking office, President Cart.er has, so far, actively carried out his
earlier promise to campaign for human rights everywhere in the
world. It would be incomprehensible if he chose to disregard the
genuine wishes of the people in Taiwan, as well as those Chinese
Americans who have business interests, investments, or relatives
on that island. He should insist that the People's Republic respect
and observe "human rights," before U.S. recognition takes place,
as he did in the case of Cuba recently. The more blatant
oppressive practices of the Peking regime aside, there have been
too many reports that Peking has refused to grant either entry
visas to Chinese Americans to visit their families on the mainland
or exit permits to allow their emigration to the United States.
Indeed, the policy of normalizing relations with Peking at any
cost is both irreversible and fraught with grave consequences. If
the American people know all the relevant facts, they would most
probably oppose such a n~dical change in American foreign
policy. Not unlike other American citizens, Chinese Americans
would also like to see the United States get the better of the
bargain with Peking, or at least, not again be shortchanged, as
has happened so often in Asia in the past.

POLICY OPTIONS
(Abstracts)
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We accept the premise that "normalization" is a set policy and
that the Shanghai communique of 1972 is the guiding spirit for it.
We also note, however, the sentiments of the majority of the
American public as revealed in a Gallup poll in late 1975: While 65
percent of those polled favNed "establishing diplomatic relations
with mainland China," 70 percent favored "continuing relations
with Nationalist China" (Taiwan).
A sensible China policy for the future, we are persuaded,
should not be conceived merely as an appendage to our
"normalization" policy. It should embody a critical review of the
full spectrum of U.S. foreign policy interests in ways that will
avoid some basic flaws and misconceptions in the Kissingerian
legacy. We should not, for example, pretend that a once-for-all
solution can be found to all our outstanding foreign policy issues,
the China question being one of them. There is no cut-and-dry
answer to the Taiwan question. Even Peking today accepts the
stark reality that the Taiwan issue will have to follow, not
precede, the establishment of diplomatic relations with
Washington. We should take a step-by-step approach in this
regard and leave the final settlement of Taiwan's future to the
vagaries of history and, as we stated in the Shanghai
communique, to the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
We should, furthermore, avoid the folly of not consulting our
major allies when crucial decisions are made. A continued U.S.J a pan partnership will strengthen our hands in dealing with
China and the Soviet Union. We should not discount lightly
Japan's opposition to our duplicating the so-called "Japanese
formula" and the reasons behind it. Japan could switch her
recognition to Peking and maintain "unofficial" relations with
Taiwan, only because slie had no defense commitment to the
island and, more important, because she could count on continued
U.S. back-up for the defenses of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.
Without the U.S. commitment, stability and security in the region
would be in jeopardy.
Another lesson from the Kissingerian failures is that we
should not expect, by any action on our part, to alter basic
Chinese or Soviet policy. China, besides, is not expected
* Professor of Political Science at New York University.
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drastically to change its relatively limited foreign trade capacity
in the foreseeable future, any more than its self-reliant policy.
Peking's trade with the United States in 1976 was only $350
million, or one-thirteenth of U.S. trade with Taiwan. Total
Chinese foreign trade volume has remained around $15 billion a
year, as compared to the U.S.'s $200 billion.
For these and other reasons, we should not base our China
policy too heavily on an over-optimistic estimate of what we shall
gain from the establishment of full diplomatic relations with
China. There is no reason to expect that compromising on Taiwan
in a manner that will please Peking will offer enough inducement
to change the latter's basic policy toward us or the Soviets. If it is
in Peking's interest to cultivate better relations with the U.S.
because of its own fear of the Soviet Union, it needs no
inducement from us to carry out that policy. Our "normalization"
policy, therefore, should not be solely premised on any real or
imagined immediate gains for us, but on what is good for longterm U.S. interests and what is appropriate in terms of our
principles and moral conviction.
The People's Republic, on the other hand, may actually
benefit more from full diplomatic relations than we do, at least in
the short run. As quid pro quo, we should require Peking to pledge
to cooperate in the limitation of strategic armaments and to
undertake not to disrupt peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific
region. If some measure of even-handedness is to be maintained
regarding Peking and Moscow, we should likewise express our
concern that the Chinese respect human rights at home.
To a large extent, a sound China policy for the future and the
stability of the Asia-Pacific basin will depend upon the specific
terms we shall accept for "normalization" and the (domestic)
measures we shall take in regard to Taiwan. The People's
Republic has insisted on three conditions for "normalization":
diplomatic recognition, abolition of our security treaty with
Taiwan, and withdrawal of U.S. troops from the island. Each of
these, we believe, must be answered forcefully and unequivocally.
We suggest the following responses:
First, diplomatic recognition of Peking will mean withdrawal
of recognition from Taiwan, or derecognition. We should state
ahead of time, therefore, that switching official recognition to
Peking will not foreclose our accepting Taiwan as a continuing
"friendly de facto entity," so far as U.S. internal laws are
concerned, until such time as a permanent solution is found by the
"Chinese themselves." Giving Taiwan this intermediate status
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will not close out future options but will for the immediate future
free us from possible domestic legal hindrances to the continuance
of certain rights and privileges essential for Taiwan's security and
stability. These include arms sales, extension of OPIC insurance
for private U.S. investments in the island, most-favored-nation
(MFN) tariff treatment, immigration quota, etc.
Second, our mutual security treaty with Taiwan will, as
already noted, most probably lapse when we switch recognition.
We should declare that the lapse will not ipso facto vitiate the U.S.
commitment to the security of the people in Taiwan. Although a
Congressional resolution might be an alternative route, the form
the statement of intent will take can be a Presidential declaration
- and this may very well be known as the Carter Doctrine in the
future - that our continued security concerns and good will for
the Taiwan people do not vanish after our recognition of Peking.
We must maintain our credibility as an ally in the eyes of friends
when seeking better relations with our adversaries.
Third, on the question of troop withdrawals from Taiwan, we
can tie our pledge to complete the withdrawals to an explicit
commitment by Peking to refrain from the use or threat of force in
the Taiwan area and to seek a peaceful settlement with the
island's people themselves.
Treaties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) will fall in a
limbo when we switch recognition. There will also be ambiguity
surrounding Taiwan's continued eligibility for certain benefits
under U.S. laws affecting arms sales, military assistance, etc. To
resolve these problems, the government may enumerate which of
the treaties or legislations, insofar as the latter apply to our
relations with Taiwan, are affected by the derecognition.
Alternatively, Washington may simply declare that "unless
otherwise explicitly stipulated" all existing treaties and
legislations shall continue to apply to Taiwan as before, and then
list the ones that the government wishes to modify or terminate.
Where legislative action is- required, a simple formula can be used
in a blanket Congressional resolution that reads like this:
Whereas the United States is determined to normalize its
relations with the People's Republic of China and recognize
the latter as the sole legal government of China; and
Whereas the United States adhere to the spirit and letter
of the Shanghai Communiqued signed between the two
countries on February 27, 1972; and
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Whereas it is the wish of the United States to maintain
peace and security in the Taiwan area until such time when
the island's future is definitively resolved: Therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress Assembled,
(a) That the United States, for domestic legal and
judicial purposes, shall, upon recognizing the People's
Republic of China, continue to treat the Republic of China on
Taiwan as a friendly political entity as though it enjoyed de
facto recognition, at least until a peaceful settlement of the
island's future has been reached by the people on both sides
of the Taiwan Strait; and
(b) That as a friendly entity as such, the Republic of
China (Taiwan) shall continue to enjoy the privileges, rights,
and conveniences or courtesies as it has enjoyed, and is
currently enjoying, prior to the United States recognition of
the People's Republic of China, pursuant to bilateral treaties,
domestic legislations, and executive decrees and regulations,
except as modified, altered, terminated and/ or amended as
follows: ....
As to the specific formula for continuing U.S. relations with
the island after derecognition, we have noted the inadequacy of
the "Japanese formula." The "two Germanies" formula may be
ideal for Taiwan, but it will probably not be acceptable to Peking.
Another way will be to reduce our relations with Taiwan to the
consular level. But this will leave the United States ill-equipped to
handle the kind of relations we should maintain, let alone to cope
with any deterioration in the power balance that might destabilize
the region.
To assure us the greatest possible flexibility, the best possible
formula - and this we can call the "American formula in reverse"
- will be to switch our Embassy and Liaison Office between
Taipei and Peking, continuing, though, the consular relations as
they currently exist between the United States and the Republic of
China (Taiwan). Since this formula does not foreclose any future
settlement of the Taiwan question, and since the Liaison Office
arrangement is currently in use between Washington and Peking,
we see no compelling reason why Peking cannot be persuaded to
accept this "American formula" (or, for that matter, "Chinese
formula") in reverse, if we insist.
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If we cannot help the 16 million people in Taiwan live out
their aspirations, the least we can do is to avoid creating a
condition where they do not even have a choice but to be forcibly
taken over by Peking. United States trade with East Asia in the
1970's already exceeded our transactions with the traditional
European allies. America's jobs, currency, and raw materials will
depend more than ever before upon economic ties with the Pacific
basin. Our interests in a stable Taiwan must be viewed in this
larger context and must not be compromised out of our eagerness
to recognize Peking.
Looking into the 1980's, our China policy should not fail to
appreciate our growing interdependence as a nation with our
Asian-Pacific partners, and to recognize that the latter's security
and stability is crucial to our own interests. As the importance of
the Asia-Pacific community grows, as it certainly will, we believe
that any sensible policy must place the China question (including
Taiwan) within that larger community context. As AsianAmericans we think we have a particular perspective to bring to
the public's discourses on U.S. foreign policy.

COMMENTARY I
HuNGDAH CHiu*

Being the only lawyer among the panelists, my comments will
be primarily on the legal aspects of U.S.-China Relations.
However, because law, morality and politics are practically
inseparable, my comments will unavoidably touch on some moral
and political aspects of the relations. Because of the limitation of
time, my comments will focus on the Shanghai Communique and
the People's Republic of China's (PRC) three conditions for
establishing diplomatic relations with the United States.
On February 27, 1972, when President Nixon concluded his
visit to the PRC, a joint communique was issued at Shanghai in
which both countries, while still disagreeing on many issues,
stated that "progress toward the normalization of relations
between China and the United States is in the interests of all
countries." Since then, many pro-PRC elements in the U.S. have
been arguing for speedy normalization of U.S. relations with the
PRC under the latter's three conditions, namely, that the U.S.
abrogate its security treaty with the Republic of China (ROC),
remove all troops from Taiwan, and sever diplomatic relations
with the ROC. These pro-PRC advocates have even argued that in
the Shanghai Communique the U.S. has already pledged to take
these steps. Is that true? I have some doubts.
So far as the relations between the ROC and the U.S. are
concerned, the Shanghai Communique is a document of both
clarity and ambiguity: clarity, because the PRC and the U.S. both
maintain that all U.S. forces should ultimately be withdrawn from
Taiwan; ambiguity, because the two sides have not agreed on how
the Taiwan question should be settled. The PRC insists that the
"liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other
country has the right to interfere." On the other hand, the U.S.
"affirms its interest in _a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question by the Chinese themselves." These statements are both
silent as to ROC-US diplomatic relations and as to the US-ROC
security treaty.
President Nixon explained the U.S. position before he went to
the PRC as follows:
In my address announcing my trip to Peking, and since then,
I have emphasized that our new dialogue with the PRC
* Professor of Law at University of Maryland Law School (Baltimore).
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would not be at the expense of friends . . . . with the
Republic of China, we shall maintain our friendship, our
diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment . . . . (Emphasis added.) ("U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, The
Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress by
Richard Nixon," (February 9, 1972), in Department of State
Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1707 (March 13, 1972), p. 330).
This position was affirmed by Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger at a press conference held on February 27, 1972 after the
issuance of the Shanghai Communique. The pertinent colloquy is
as follows:
Why did not the United States Government reaffirm its
treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have
.done on numerous occasions?
Q.

'Dr. Kissinger: ... Let me ... state in response to this and
any related question - and let me do it once and not repeat
it: We stated our basic position with respect to this issue in
the President's world report [of February 9, 1972] in which we
say that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed
in that position . . .. the position of the world report stands
and has been unaltered. ("President Nixon's Visit to the PRC
- News Conference of Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Green,"
(Shanghai, February 27, 1972), in Department of State
Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1708 (March 20, 1972), p. 428).
On the question of Taiwan, the U.S. declared in the Commumque:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either
side of Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and
Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government
does not challenge that position. (Emphasis added)
It must be pointed out that anyone with an elementary
knowledge of international law should know that the phrase,
"does not challenge" is not equivalent to a recognition of the
Chinese claim. This interpretation is also confirmed by a high
official of the U.S. government. Soon after the issuance of the
Shanghai Communique, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian Affairs Marshall Green denied that the communique
represented any change in the position held by the U.S. since 1950
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that the status of Taiwan is as yet undetermined ("Transcript of
['Meet the Press'] T.V. Interview with [Marshall] Green," Mainchi
Daily News, March 29, 1972, p. 2).
Moreover, the term "China" mentioned in the Communique
has a different meaning to people on either side of the Taiwan
Strait. To the people of Taiwan, the term "China" means the
Republic of China, i.e., a country whose social system is based on
individual freedom and private enterprise. There has not been the
slightest evidence that the people of Taiwan want to be a part of
China if the term "China" means the People's Republic of China,
that is, a country whose social system is based on totalitarianism
and collectivism. If the policy makers in the U.S. and the PRC had
the moral courage to accept the challenge of an internationally
supervised plebiscite or poll conducted in Taiwan, I can assure
you that the great majority of the people there would reject any
proposal to make them a part of the PRC. Thus, even in
accordance with the Shanghai Communique there remains
absolutely no legal, moral, or political basis for the U.S. "not to
challenge" the PRC's claim to Taiwan; the Communique does not
imply, either in law or in its plain meaning, a U.S. acquiescence in
the PRC's claims to Taiwan.
In view of the above analysis, under the Shanghai Communique there is no legal or political basis under which the U.S.
would be obliged to accept the three conditions of the PRC in
normalizing relations. Some pro-PRC elements have argued that
there was a tacit, implicit pledge in the Shanghai Communique or
by President Nixon or Secretary of State Kissinger to accept the
three conditions. Even so, then, this raises two very serious
questions: (1) Has the U.S. government clearly explained this
point to the American people and American allies? (2) Does the
U.S. President or the Secretary of State have the constitutional
authority to commit the U.S. to such a secret agreement? In other
words, would such an agreement be binding? Needless to say, the
answer to these questions must be negative.
Moreover, in 1975, the U.S. State Department publicly
declared that any explicit commitment made by the President
toward a foreign country has no legally binding force. The
Department indicated that it does not even keep records of exactly
how many commitments are made by American Presidents or of
their terms. (See "A President's word not legally binding." The
Sun [Baltimore], July 9, 1975, p. A2). If an explicit commitment
made by a President alone is not legally binding, how can a secret
declaration of intention or agreement, if any, made by any U.S.
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President, have any political or legal meaning at all in the eyes of
the American people?
With respect to the U.S. Security Treaty with the ROC, we
should recall that a ratified treaty, according to the Constitution
of the U.S., is part of the "supreme law of the land." According to
the U.S. Constitution, a President, before he enters on the
execution of his office, must "solemnly swear" that he "will to the
best of [his] ability, preserve, protect and defend, the Constitution
of the United States." Now, some pro-PRC elements urge the
President of the United States to abrogate this treaty at the
demand of a foreign country, by passing by Executive fiat the will
of the people expressed through the Senate's ratification process.
Isn't that absurd?
The racial aspect of the question of accepting the PRC's three
conditions for establishing diplomatic relations should not be
overlooked. The great majority of Senators and Congressmen of
Asian origin and the black caucus in the Congress have indicated
their opposition to termination of diplomatic relations and the
security treaty with the ROC as the price for normalizing relations
with the PRC. On the other hand, the U.S. government officials
and scholars consulted by the government who have advocated
the acceptance of the PRC's three conditions are almost all white.
In formulating their policy suggestion to U.S. government, they
have excluded the participation of Asian-American political and
academic leaders who have strong cultural, trade, emotional and
family ties with the people of Taiwan. This exclusion of the
participation of Asian-Americans in the decision-making process
concerning a question of their vital concern is evidenced by the
lack of Asian-Americans among the State Department's high
officials dealing with East Asia, the State Department's policy
panel on China, and the membership of the National Security
Council.
On the other hand, the white immigrants from the three
Baltic states have exerted strong influence on the U.S. policy
toward the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that these three nonexistent states were annexed by the Soviet Union almost four
decades ago, the United States has continued to grant them
recognition and has maintained diplomatic relations with their
legations here.
In my view, the real situation facing the U.S. in its China
policy today is that there are, in fact, two Chinese governments,
each controlling large territories and governing effectively.
Because the PRC is a reality and a world power, it is certainly in
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the interest of the U.S. to normalize relations with her. But in
pursuing that course, it is equally important to face the reality of
the Republic of China on Taiwan and its 16 million people.
The Republic of China on Taiwan is closely linked with the
U.S. in political, economic and cultural ties. It has a steadily
expanding gross national product, now at the level of about $17
billion annually. The per capital income of $800.00 in 1976 is
about four times than that of the PRC. Its present annual foreign
trade of about $15 billion is more than that of the PRC. In 1976,
the ROC-US trade reached the record level of $4.8 billion, which
was about 13 times that of the PRC-US trade in the same year.
Moreover, more than 200,000 U.S. tourists visited the ROC in
1976, compared with less than 5,000 who visited the PRC in that
year. The ROC has also strong ties in all aspects with many
Asian-Americans in this country.
In view of this situation, the only realistic, moral and legal
policy of the U.S. toward China is to recognize each Chinese
government - the PRC and the ROC - as the government of the
territory it controls. At the same time, the U.S. should also make it
clear that it will not object to the unification of China if it can be
achieved by peaceful means. There is nothing in the Shanghai
Communique which would legally prevent the U.S. from taking
such a policy toward the two Chinas, and this is the only policy
which is consistent with principles of international law, justice,
and respect for human rights and self-determination - all
principles this great democracy has cherished since the founding
of this republic two hundred years ago.

COMMENTARY II
YING-MAo

KAu*

The panel organizers and the paper writers should be
congratulated on the excellent choice of topics and themes for our
panel and on the superb presentation of the papers before us
today. The three background papers lay out chronologically the
historical and political contexts of the evolution of Sino-American
relations for the past century or so; and the position paper
articulates systematically and imaginatively the major problems,
issues and policy options that confront our China policy in the
years ahead.
I am very pleased to note that all the papers have stressed the
complexities and intricacies of the temporal and spatial contexts
of changing U.S.-China relations in each historical period.
Throughout the presentation the panel has lucidly underscored
the methodological assumption that before we raise the policy
question, "Where do we go from here?" we have to know, "How
did we get here in the first place?'' The papers demonstrate
uniformly a strong sense of intellectual realism and integrity.
They all share the view that in making foreign policy no nation
can afford to forsake the moral obligations which it has
accumulated over time or ignore troublesome conditions as if they
simply did not exist. The papers remind us that the success of a
foreign policy depends primarily on meticulous analysis of
objective conditions and dispassionate reasoning and planning,
and not on its political rhetoric or ideological attractiveness. For
many Asian-Americans, the issue of US-PRC normalization and
the problem of Taiwan can easily evoke deep ideological and
partisan emotions. It should be noted, however, that the papers
before us today demonstrate an impressive level of objectivity and
scholarship.
As I find little disagreements with the historical analyses of
various periods which are- presented with impeccable competence
by Professors Tang, Yang, and Chang, my comments will be
confined primarily to the policy matters discussed by Professor
Hsiung. I am particularly impressed by the argument that our
policy toward the Asia-Pacific region in general and toward the
PRC in particular should be designed to achieve, among other
things, (1) further consolidation and development of our leadership role and of the credibility of our policy in Asia, (2) the
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preservation and maintenance of the peace, stability and
prosperity of the region, (3) the strengthening of our political and
economic ties with our major ally, Japan, and (4) the completion
of our normalization with the PRC with a guarantee that the
Taiwan issue should be settled peacefully. While agreeing with the
thrust of these analyses and arguments, I wish to raise three
specific points for further discussion: one concerns the future
strategy of the U.S. in Asia, and the others are related to the
question of normalization and Taiwan.
First, in recent years the legacy of Kissinger's diplomacy, as
Professor Hsiung correctly pointed out, has led many Americans
to believe that a fundamental transformation of the international
system has taken place in the 1970s: cold-war containment and
confrontation between the East and the West have come to an
end, and a new era of detente and cooperation has begun. The
bipolarized world of the post-World War II years has been replaced
by a new order based on a triangular balance of power. Hence, it
is argued, the old strategic concepts, such as alliance and
containment, which were stressed in the past to deal with the
expansion of Communist influence, are now obsolete and should
be discarded.
Surely, the basic alignments of world politics have changed
substantially between the fifties and the seventies. But is it true
that the traditional strategic concepts of our foreign policy have
all become inoperative? The answer clearly depends on a number
of factors: for instance, on the extent to which the basic nature
and process of East-West rivalry has been altered, and on the
extent to which the major Communist powers have begun to share
our new perception and new optimism, and have shown us clear
evidence of their willingness and commitment to cooperate in
creating a new world order. I am not sure that the answer to these
questions can be entirely positive. Nor am I sure that in the arena
of foreign policy and world politics one should dichotomize
strategic concepts such as confrontation and cooperation, or
containment and detente as mutually exclusive categories in
policy formulation. The conduct of world politics, in my judgment,
is simply too complex and dynamic to fit into any of these neat,
clear-cut formulas.
I think, therefore, that any unilateral reorientation toward
detente and goodwill on our part in Asia without due regard for
the long-range objectives and short-term tactics of our adversaries
would be, to say the least, unrealistic and naive. Such a move may
even run the risk of miscalculation and misunderstanding, and
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may precipitate opportunistic actions which would undermine the
existing stability and balance of power in Asia. History has
amply testified that effective diplomacy ought to be flexible and
reasonable, yet realistic and firm.
Second, I wish to raise the question as to how high a priority
the PRC seems to give to the goal of liberating Taiwan on its
foreign policy agenda? Do they rank it No. 1 or No.2 in priority?
Is it the case that Peking has assigned the Taiwan issue a priority
below that of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the threat of "social
imperialism" all over the world? Citing Keng Piao's statement of
last fall that "Even if Sino-American relations were normalized, it
would still be impossible to liberate Taiwan," Professor Hsiung
concludes that Peking appears to be willing to accept the
separation of the normalization issue from that of Taiwan. In
other words, the PRC is believed to be interested in completing the
process of normalization with the U.S. on the basis of the
Shanghai Communique (specified in terms of the "three basic
conditions"), while allowing the Taiwan problem to be settled
separately and "peacefully" at an undetermined future date. Is
this indeed the real intention of Peking? Or is it more likely, as
suggested by Professor Chang, that Peking is pursuing a "twophase" tactic with regard to Taiwan: namely, to disengage the
U.S. politically and militarily from Taiwan first, and than to press
on the Taiwan question at a time and under a condition of
Peking's own choosing?
If we take Keng Piao's words at their face value, considering
them sincere and trustworthy, as some specialists would argue,
how can we reconcile Keng's moderate words with the militant
statement made by Li Hsien-nien just last month, in which he
asserted that the Taiwan problem could not be resolved without a
fight. Worse still, how are we going to handle the even greater
uncertainties as to who will be in charge in Peking in the years to
come, and what policy lines with regard to Taiwan they may
pursue?
The conclusion seems clear: if we are serious about our
commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question and
to the security and aspirations of the sixteen million people on the
island, the U.S. can not rely solely on informal understandings
and pledges from the leaders in China who happen to be in power
at this time. There is no substitute, in my opinion, for a formal
and concrete arrangement which will involve all the three parties
concerned. Informalities and ambiguities can only lead to
misunderstanding and miscalculation with disastrous consequences.
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Finally, I am rather surprised to see that none of the papers
today has touched on the subject of Taiwan's military capability
to defend itself in the event of a decision by China to liberate
Taiwan by force following U.S. military disengagement from the
island. As we know, with American military and technical
assistance in the past three decades Taiwan has developed fairly
efficient military forces with some sophisticated modern weapons.
Time does not allow me here to discuss the special characteristics
(strengths as well as weaknesses) of the armed forces on Taiwan.
However, military specialists seem to be unanimous in their
opinion that its strengths notwithstanding, Taiwan's military
forces alone could not sustain a prolonged armed assault from
China. Some would even go further to argue that psychological
warfare by China coupled with the threat of force alone would be
sufficient to seriously disrupt the trade-oriented, capital-intensive
economy of Taiwan, and effectively undermine the island's socialpolitical stability in a relatively short period of time.
In recent months, the so-called "Vietnamese formula" for
resolving the Taiwan problem seems to be gaining increasing
acceptance in certain quarters. The formula stresses in essence the
building up of Taiwan's military strength and stockpile of
necessary arms supplies prior to American derecognition and
withdrawal from Taiwan with the hope that Taiwan would be
able to maintain its own security vis-a-vis the PRC. In view of the
peculiar economic and military conditions on Taiwan as well as
the extraordinary strength that the PRC is capable of mobilizing
if it chooses to do so, the pitfalls of such a formula are obvious.
Overestimation of Taiwan's military and economic capabilities at
this juncture is bound to result in a gross miscalculation with
disastrous consequences for Taiwan in the future. In order to keep
good our promise to protect the security and aspirations of the
sixteen million people of Taiwan, it is eminently more sensible for
us to take the trouble now to work out an unambiguous policy and
course of action which can guarantee the objective of peaceful
settlement that we have set out to achieve. We as a nation should
not allow ourselves to indulge in temporary expediency and selfdeception which in the long run may trap us in a worse dilemma
and greater trouble.

COMMENTARY III
KING

c.

CHEN*

I enjoyed reading these four papers, particularly Professor
James Hsiung's, which is well deliberated and carefully phrased.
Within the time limit, I will briefly discuss first the historical
background of U.S.-China relationships and then turn to policy
considerations.
Beginning from Anson Burlingame's diplomatic service for
China in 1867 as elaborated in Professor Tong's paper, the U.S.
has been more friendly to China than have been other big powers.
Although the United States and China mutually made mistakes
in the past century, the two countries generally remained friendly
to each other. But when we broaden our perspective of SinoAmerican relations, we see Russia after Japan watch the situation
closely for any possible gains from China that have directly or
indirectly discredited the U.S. relationship with China. Several
historical events bear out this observation, such as Russia's thinly
disguised rejection of the Open Door Policy, Soviet aid to China in
1937-39 to deter Japan from advancing rapidly to northwestern
China, the unjustifiable Yalta secret agreement, and Stalin's
assistance to the PRC in the Korean war against the United
States. In sum, from friendship to hostility between China and the
United States, the Soviet factor, whether behind the scenes or not,
has played an important role in the changing courses of
development.
The "reopening" of China in 1972 involved once again the
Soviet Union. It is no longer a secret that the Peking leaders
turned about face to the United States for assistance in opposition
to the U.S.S.R. This is a dramatic and effective strategy. In our
search for a new U.S.-China relationship today, we should bear in
mind this historical and strategic background.
In several statements by President Carter and other officials
in the past year, the present Administration has set forth a few
basic principles for developing new relationships with the People's
Republic of China; they are normalization of U.S. relations with
the PRC, maintenance of peace and stability in Asia, and
preservation of freedom and security of Taiwan. To develop such
new relationships, the United States, as President Carter declared
at the United Nations on March 17, 1977, will act in "the spirit of
the Shanghai Communique."
What is the "spirit" of the Shanghai Communique? There has
been no official definition of it, nor is theYe an established public
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consensus. Unlike "the Bandung Spirit" of 1955 which is
generally understood to mean "peace, good will, conciliation, anticolonialism, and unity of Asian and African nations," the "spirit
of the Shanghai Communique" is vague in its meaning and not at
all specific.
If we leave the "spirit" aside and examine the Shanghai
Communique itself, we find that it is a document of clarity and
ambiguity. It contains one agreement (clarity) and three nonagreements (ambiguities) which take the form of unilateral
declarations or non-declarations by either side. The one agreement
(the only one) is on the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military
installations from Taiwan. The three non-agreements are complicated. The first is the U.S. reaffirmation of its interest in "peaceful
settlement" of Taiwan, while China declares that the settlement of
Taiwan is "China's internal affair in which no other country has
the right to interfere." In the second, the United States does not
"challenge" China's unilaterally declared position on her opposition to "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two
governments," and other devices. This is neither an agreement
nor a disagreement. As regards the third non-agreement, there is
no mention, let alone agreement, of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual
Defense Treaty. On this third point, one may well ask: Was
Peking's later proposal for the abrogation of the Mutual Defense
Treaty, as one of the three Chinese conditions for normalization,
made in the "spirit" of the Shanghai Communique?
Both the Shanghai Communique and President Carter's
statements have expressed continuing U.S. interest in peaceful
settlement of Taiwan and of disputes in Asia. It is a lofty principle
and we must uphold it. Moreover, Peking, through Keng Piao's
secret speech on August 24, 1976, expressed its intention to
separate the issue of U.S. diplomatic recognition from the future
settlement of Taiwan. An open statement by Deputy Premier Li
Hsien-nien in March 1977 also indicated that Taiwan was not a
priority issue for China and that China had many other more
urgent things to do, such as further development of relations with
the U.S., national defense, and modernization plans. If Peking's
intention and priority here are real, then the PRC is going to
"normalize" relations with Washington in the near future and to
"settle" the Taiwan issue at a later time. Furthermore, we AsianAmericans understand well that American public opinions play a
very significant. role in formulating United States foreign policy.
In October 1975, a Gallup poll showed that while 61 percent
favored U.S. diplomatic relations with the PRC, at the same time
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70 percent favored the continuation of formal relations with
Taiwan. Could the U.S. government ignore such a clear expression of American public opinions?
For the above reasons, we see that "normalization" is not as
simple as "an invitation to dinner." It is a complex process; many
principles and interests should be observed, and many problems
should be dealt with. If a new American China policy, under the
name of the "American formula" or "Asian-American formula," to
be more fashionable on today's occasion, is to be developed and
applied in accordance with the aforesaid three American principles, the United States should either obtain Peking's agreement
on, or declare its determination to uphold, the following five items
of interest:
1. Improvement of relationships with Peking to formal

diplomatic recognition, but no date should be set.
2. Peaceful settlement of Taiwan by the Chinese themselves.
3. Prior to a peaceful settlement, Taiwan continues to be a
friendly political entity to the United States with diplomatic delegation in Washington and America's diplomatic
mission in Taipei.
4. The continuation of U.S. commitment to the defense of
Taiwan pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty until a
peaceful settlement is implemented.
5. Human rights of the 16 million people on Taiwan should
be respected. They should not be handed over to any
regime against their will and rights. The Jeffersonian
concept of the "general will of the people" must be upheld.
This package of normalization is mostly in disagreement with
Professor Hsiung's proposal. But the issue here is not agreement
or disagreement among the panelists, rather it is whether Peking
will accept it. Judging by Peking's public attitude toward the
issue, I see little likelihood that Peking will readily do so. But, if
we ponder the issue further, there is a possibility that Peking may
consider it hard and may eventually accept it in principle. The
reason is twofold. First, this package is an American (not anyone
else's) proposal, and it is a matter of negotiation principle and a
game strategy that the U.S. should lay down its own conditions as
bargaining chips. Why should the U.S. offer all its chips to Peking
without bargaining or negotiations? Second, Peking has the
unpublicized intention of separating the Taiwan issue from U.S.
diplomatic recognition, as discussed earlier, and has adopted a
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give-and-take strategy as disclosed by Keng Piao (to take
advantage of improved relations with the U.S. against the Soviet
Union, and to give in on certain issues including Taiwan). After
all, Peking, in accepting this package in principle, still has the
right to declare its position on Taiwan or its disagreements with
the United States as it did in the Shanghai Communique.
I believe that peaceful settlement between the PRC and
Taiwan should be a major and firm interest of America's new
China policy. As a matter of fact, the United States has repeatedly
declared its importance. The United States must insist on its
implementation so as to ensure the maintenance of peace and
stability in Asia. If there are any important principles in accord
with the "spirit" of the Shanghai Communique, this is definitely
one of them.
My conviction of a "peaceful settlement" goes much deeper
than the search for a solution to the Taiwan problem. Although it
may be out of proportion to discuss it here in detail today, I will
briefly mention my main ideas. In historical perspective, China
has experienced hundreds of wars and armed conflicts in the
dynastic cycles of division and reunification. These wars have
helped bring China a glorious history and civilization and
countless great heroes, but also untold human tragedies and
impoverishment. The history of modern China, so clear and
familiar to all of us, is an epitome of such glorious-tragic records.
Political leaders in modern times (whether warlords or armed
revolutionaries) have known only how to scramble for power and
how to wage wars; little economic reconstruction was introduced,
little social innovation was initiated, and almost no scientific and
technological progress was made to improve the quality of the life
of the people. Worse still, wars created opportunities for foreign
powers to exploit and divide China, particularly for the neighbors
in the east and in the north. Strongly determined to eliminate all
wars in the future, Dr. Sun Yat-sen introduced a parliamentary
system into China with the hope that the Chinese could settle all
their differences and disputes by nonviolent means in meeting
chambers rather than on the battlefield. Sun did not succeed in
this lofty yet difficult task because he lacked the power to enforce
it. But we must continue to campaign for nonviolent settlement of
all Chinese affairs. The Taiwan issue today is a good case to set a
precedent for it.
To set such a precedent, the United States should offer its
help, and only the U.S. can help. The American commitment to
Taiwan since 1954 should be used as a leverage for the
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achievement of a nonviolent settlement. The power of enforcement
is in American hands. Moreover, dealing with the Soviet Union is
in both American and Chinese interests. If the U.S. can develop
with China a common interest in coping with Russia, Washington
may have the necessary leverage to enforce such a peaceful
settlement. Any bloodshed between the Chinese on both sides of
the Taiwan Strait will not serve the interests of the U.S. or China,
but it may serve those of the U.S.S.R.
What would happen if the U.S. leverage fails to work? Since
the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is merely symbolic and risks no
war, we must be patient. The United States should not give up this
leverage and task; it should continue to honor its commitment to
Taiwan until such a time when both Peking and Taipei come to a
peaceful solution.

COMMENTARY IV
TEH-KUANG CHANG*

For the national interest of the United States, the "normalization" of relations with the People's Republic of China is not
simply a matter of extending diplomatic recognition to the Peking
regime, but a step-by-step process of settlement of existing
disputes between these two nations. For American diplomatic
strategy, it would be wise to keep the options open rather than to
consider raising the Liaison Office in Peking and downgrading
the Embassy in Taipei.
As the leader of the free world, and with the capability of a
super-power, the U.S. diplomacy on "normalization" should be
based on a concrete reciprocity rather than one-sided concessions
from the U.S. Thus the American strategy should include a series
of countermeasures for the purpose of promoting world peace,
preserving the regional security of Asia as well as protecting the
national interest of the U.S.
1. On World Peace: The People's Republic of China is a
nuclear power, but it has neither signed the Treaty of Nuclear
Test-Ban, nor the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It has the largest army in the world; however, it did not join
the disarmament negotiations such as the SALT talks. If the
"normalization" is an approach for world peace, to bind the PRC
to a disarmament negotiation table should be a priority issue for
any negotiation for diplomatic relations.
2. On the regional security of Asia: The "Shanghai Communique" of February 28, 1972, set up the terms for the withdrawal of
American military personnel from Taiwan as international
tensions diminished. At that time, it was made on the assumption
that Community China would influence a peaceful settlement of
Viet Nam. However, South Vietnam was conquered by North
Vietnam by war rather than by peaceful settlement as the U.S.
expected. The U.S. has kept its promise to withdraw its military
personnel from Taiwan, even though the international tension in
Asia has not been diminished. North Korea still threatens a
possible attack on South Korea, and the Communists remain
fighting on the border of Thailand and Malaysia. Thus the U.S.
should seek a guarantee from Communist China for a peaceful
settlement of the Korean problem and to refrain from supporting
the Communist guerillas in Southeast Asia. This is not only an
* Professor of Political Science at Ball State University (Muncie, Indiana).
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approach for stability and security in Asia, but also for the
facilitation of the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Korea.
3. On the U.S. Alliance: Communist China's formulas for
"normalization" of relations with the U.S.A. includes three
conditions: (1) the severance of diplomatic relations with the
Republic of China, (2) the abolition of the Embassy of the
Republic of China in Washington and the American Embassy in
Taipei, (3) and the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty
between the Republic of China and the U.S.A. These provisions
are not mentioned in the "Shanghai Communique." Thus the U.S.
has not only a sound basis to defend its position against
Communist demands, but also could adopt counter-measures by
demanding the abolition of the 1950 Treaty of Alliance between
the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.
The 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty is a defensive
one and does not specify the enemy target. However, the 1950
People's Republic of China and Soviet Union Alliance Treaty is
an offensive one and specifies Japan and its allies, the U.S.A. by
implication, as the potential enemy. Thus, the U.S. has more
reason to ask the People's Republic of China to abrogate the
provocative Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 as a pre-requisite for
"normalization" of relations rather than the 1954 Sino-U.S.
Mutual Defense Treaty.
4. On Diplomatic Relations: In the "Shanghai Communique," the United States has indicated that it would not
challenge the "One China Concept" which is a common position
of the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan strait.
The United States desires to promote the diplomatic relationship with China to a "normal" level until the conditions of China
become stabilized. However, the situation of China has not
reached a "normal" condition, either the unification of the
mainland and Taiwan or the unity of the political factions on the
mainland itself. The United States has sufficient reasons to
defend its position, because the American recognition of the
National Government of Nanking was delayed to 1928, that is,
until China was legally unified. If a new political change is
finalized, such as the unification of the mainland and Taiwan, the
United States will make any necessary adjustment of diplomatic
relations with China. Today the United States has maintained the
status quo until a new situation emerges, rather than prejudice the
power-holders of China. The United States should clearly indicate
that it is impartial in the internal political change rather than
interfere with the domestic affairs of China. Thus, the United
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States has maintained only one embassy in the territory of China
rather than initiate any substitute agency of a diplomatic nature.
It is the People's Republic of China that suggested the set-up of
"Liaison Office" in Peking and Washington. The "Liaison Office"
can handle more affairs than an embassy can. The ambassador
from the People's Republic of China can see the American
President and the Secretary of State directly. Therefore, the
"normalization" of relationship can be carried on even without an
embassy. However, the achievement of the "Liaison Office" is
very limited. This is not a problem of institution, but the problem
of function. Thus, the problem is how to develop the better
relationship through the "Liaison Office" rather than to elevate it
to an embassy without making any progress in this relationship.
5. On the Peaceful Settlement of the Taiwan Problem: In the
"Shanghai Communique" the United States insisted on a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan problem. The Chinese Communists
understand the U.S. position even though they express a desire for
"liberation of Taiwan." The "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan
problem is a basic policy of the United States for the maintenance
of peace and security in Asia. However, in the summer of 1976
while he was in power, Chang Chun-Chiao (now one of the "Gang
of Four") with his capacity as a Vice-premier, told Senator Scott
(R.-Pa.) that a military solution of the Taiwan problem was
possible. Li Shien-Nien, current vice-premier, told Mr. Hamilton,
the London Times correspondent that the problem of Taiwan
could not be settled without a war. Chi Teng-Kuei, another current
vice-premier, told Yomiuri Shombun correspondent (May 15, 1977)
that the Communist China would take over Taiwan by force if
necessary. This is certainly contrary to the U.S. position which
was expressed in the "Shanghai Communique." Should the
United States make a concession under such a threat or stand
firm in defending its position to prevent a possible war over
Taiwan?
6. On the Principles _of American Diplomacy: In dealing with
the People's Republic of China on "normalization," it is necessary
to bear in mind the basic principle of American foreign policy,
such as "morality," "democracy," and "human rights." Although
the United States would not challenge the "One China" concept
which is a position adopted by the Chinese of both sides of the
Taiwan Straits, the United States should insist on the principle of
"democracy" for the people in Taiwan to decide whether or not
they are willing to join the mainland under Communist rule.
Especially, the "hurp.an right~" become an issue in U.S.-Soviet
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relations, it is unwise to make an exemption of Communist China
simply because they have a stricter control over their people.
7. On the Anti-American Propaganda: The "normalization"
of relations should be approached for "friendship" rather than for
"animosity." Since the admission of Communist China into the
U.N., the United States no longer condemns Communist China as
"aggressors" which was adopted by the U.N. resolution during the
period of the Korean War. However, by contrast the Chinese
Communists continuously denounce the United States as "imperialists." The campaign of hatred of U.S. and the anti-American
propaganda should be ended in order to establish an atmosphere
of mormalization of "friendly" relationship.
8. On the treatment of American representatives in Peking:
While Communist China has set a limitation on the range of
American travel outside of Peking, the United States also set a
limitation on the Communist diplomats' travel outside of
Washington. However, President Carter has recently abolished
such limitation so that the Communist Chinese representatives
could travel outside Washington. Especially the Chinese Communists can meet the people freely. The United States should ask for
reciprocal treatment from Peking by allowing the Americans to
travel outside Peking and meet the people freely. Otherwise it
makes no sense to consider raising the status of the Liaison
Office.
9. On the Control of Narcotics Traffic: Since international
narcotics traffic has become a serious problem, the United States
should lose no chance to seek an agreement with a nation which
produces opium and exports narcotics to the United States.
According to Gara Hamburger, an Austrian correspondent, Chou
En-lai told Nasser in 1965 that the Chinese Communists tried
their best to supply the best opium to the American soldiers in
VietNam. Congressman John R. Raxtrick stated on December 2,
1973, that Red Chinese "friends" were sending a big amount of
opium to the United States. Thus, the United States should take
the opportunity during the process of "normalization" of relationships to seek an agreement from Peking to stop the exportation of
opium from China to the United States.
10. On Internal Subversion Activities: The basic position of
Communist China is to continue world Communism even though
the diplomatic tactics have been changed. In order to prevent the
Chinese Communists' strategy of expansion of Communism in the
United States by infiltration and subversion, the United States
should seek an agreement from the Peoples' Republic of China.
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This would be not only in general terms of non-intervention of
domestic but also, more specifically, prohibit infiltration or
subversion in any form as supported by any methods by any
groups or individuals who endanger the democracy of the United
States. One should bear in mind the experience of the United
States' recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. The United States
always trusted the Soviet Union's words of promise rather than
its deeds. Thus, the Soviet Union has a record of violation of
agreement and treaties since the United States recognized the
Kremlin. While the old red giant is out of control by the diplomacy
of recognition, the United States should use this experience to deal
with the new red giant in the "normalization" of relationships.
The United States should make clear that it wiU proceed to the
normalization; however, the final goal of diplomatic recognition
can only be achieved with the fulfillment of all prerequisites. The
United States should declare that the United States will recognize
without prejudice any national government of China so long as
China is unified. Meanwhile, the U.S. has no choice but to
continue the relationship status quo with a government which has
already maintained diplomatic relations. The United States
should keep its alternatives open rather than shift diplomatic
recognition from one area to another simply under international
pressure, but in doing so it jeopardizes its basic policy of morality,
legality and democracy.
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